A MEA CULPA FOR THE FELIX CULPA?

Ian Spencer

One of the most promising defenses theists in general have against the problems of evil and hell
is the free will defense. This defense, however, requires assuming an incompatibilist conception
of free will. For those who have either doubts about this free will response or wish to hold to a
compatibilist view of free will, however, exploring further defensive options is desirable.
Elaborating on an old theme, I will defend a version of the greater-goods defense and offer it as a
defensible, though controversial, alternative to the free will defense. Like all greater-goods
views, this one relies on explaining the existence of evil in terms of the greater goods that come
out of it.

Among these goods are the greater goods of Incarnation and Atonement, their

respective goodness consisting in large part in the higher-order divine good of glorifying God
through the display of divine virtue.
Given a Libertarian1 view of free will, the free will defense2 seems to be a likely
candidate for successfully defusing the problem of evil. The basic strategy involved in this
defense would be to claim that God could not guarantee an evil-free world unless he refrained
from creating free, morally-responsible, rational creatures. However, without the assumption of
Libertarian freedom – or at least its possibility – the free will defense does not seem able to get
off the ground. After all, if compatibilism were true then it would seem that God could actually

1

Libertarian views of free will take it that causal determinism is incompatible with free will (that is, they
are incompatibilist) and that we do in fact have this incompatibilist kind of freedom.
2
In the literature, there has tended to be a strict distinction between what are called theodicies, which try to
justify God’s permission of evil in terms of what are supposedly his actual reasons for doing so, and
defenses, which merely try to show that God’s existence is compatible with the existence of evil by coming
up with possible reasons that would justify God’s permission. For my purposes here, I will use ‘theodicy’,
‘defense’, and ‘response’ pretty much interchangeably and will not make any distinction between the
categories.

guarantee an evil-free world full of free creatures just by making sure that the initial conditions
and laws of nature were such as to guarantee that no sin or evil actually ever arises.
In addition, if there is no Libertarian free will, then the free will defense may not be the
only response to the problem of evil to suffer because of it. It seems to me that soul-making
views (according to which evil and suffering are required for growth into moral or spiritual
maturity) themselves may, if they are to be plausible, need to rest on a foundation of Libertarian
freedom. Otherwise, it may be hard to see why God could not simply create each of us already in
full maturity and in complete sinless perfection. Whatever the case may be on this issue,
however, I will simply leave soul-making views mostly to the side for the purposes of the rest of
this paper.
A large number of Christian theists, of course, do in fact believe in Libertarian freedom
and, hence, such thinkers often find the free will defense to be fairly convincing as a response to
the problems raised by suffering and evil. In the minds of such believers, it may seem that all we
really need to do is to defend Libertarian freedom and the free will defense which relies upon it in
order to do a good job of defending theism or the Christian faith against the attack from evil.
However, many Christians and other theists are not in fact Libertarians and many explicitly reject
incompatibilist views of freedom. For these latter folks, there will be a very genuine interest in
developing a response to the problem that does not rely on a kind of freedom that they would
question or sometimes even reject. For these folks, there is a very genuine need to develop an
alternative response.
But it is not simply the anti-Libertarian theist who ought to have an interest in the
development of a theodicy which does not presuppose Libertarianism.

The Libertarian

committed to the free will defense ought to be interested in such a project as well. For one thing,
we could be wrong about free will – perhaps compatibilism is true. It would be nice if we had a
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backup plan – a kind of defensive fall-back position or Plan B – just in case the whole
Libertarianism thing simply does not work out in the end. In addition, it could help win others to
theism or at least help them to think it just a little less implausible than they did previously. If I
am having a discussion with a die-hard compatibilist and I want to try to convince them to
become a theist, asking them to first swallow Libertarianism may be too big a pill for them to
take. Better, instead, to find something better suited to their condition – that is, a reply to the
problem of evil which a compatibilist can consistently accept.

Lastly, developing a

Libertarianism-free response may be a good idea in the unlikely event that, despite the truth of
Libertarianism, the free will defense still cannot quite cut it in defeating the problem of evil.
So given that we ought to be interested in developing a response to the problem of evil
which is consistent with compatibilism, what are our available options? Not the free will defense,
for obvious reasons, and I have already explicitly set soul-making views aside. For the sake of
this paper, I will also set aside so-called ‘skeptical theist’ responses to the problem and consider
only those responses which try to show the actual or possible reasons which might justify God’s
permission of evil. To remain as orthodox as possible, let us also set aside any views which
require that we make God less than perfectly good, knowledgeable or powerful, as well as any
sort of view which claims that good can only exist if there is some evil for it to stand in contrast
with.
The option I would propose instead is a kind of greater-good defense against the problem
of evil. Not every version of a greater-good defense is going to work, of course, so the success of
such a defense will depend on the details, including crucially the precise goods we take to be
great enough to justify allowing all of the world’s evil. As our springboard into developing a
better greater-good defense, I want to take a look at some remarks of Mackie’s on greater-good
responses to evil. With J. L. Mackie (1955), let us call evils such as pain and suffering, which do
not necessarily metaphysically require the presence of other evils for their existence, first order
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evils. Similarly, call goods such as pleasure which also do not require any evils, first order
goods. Mackie suggests that a theist might respond to the problem of evil by insisting that the
existence of first order evil is justified because it is necessary for the existence of the more
valuable second order goods. Here, second order goods could be things like acts of courage or
sacrifice – exercises of certain important virtues which cannot exist in the absence of any evils.
Without threat of danger or without real cost, for instance, there could be no genuine acts of
courage or sacrifice – evil is a logical precondition for anything to count as falling into the
category of such goods. However, Mackie thinks that there are also second order evils which are
not required for the existence of genuine second order goods. These would be things like hatred
or cruelty, which the world could do entirely without and yet still contain plenty in the way of
acts of courage or sacrifice. Following Stewart (1993, 15-16), it is possible to respond at this
point that some human actions, such as forgiveness, are third order goods which do in fact
require second order evils. However, Mackie (1955, 207-208) takes it that no matter how high
we go up, third order or even higher, there will always be an evil at the same order which will not
be justified at that order. If we then try to move up an order to some higher good which requires
this evil, we will just have pushed the problem up a level once again and we are off on an infinite
regress.
Now, I think there may in fact be room to dispute Mackie on his infinite regress claim,
even if we concern ourselves solely with human moral goods. However, I think Mackie’s
discussion can help point us in a more promising direction – if we focus on human goods, we
may end up explaining quite a lot of the evil that exists in the world, but there may still remain
some evil left-over that no purely human good can cover. Rather than look at human goods
involving human manifestations or displays of various virtues, I suggest that we look to divine
goods – that is, divine manifestations or displays of various virtues. It is not implausible, after all,
to think that divine displays of divine virtue are much – if not infinitely – more valuable than
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otherwise similar human displays of the same or similar virtues. And, of course, many of these
displays will require the existence of evil in the world. More importantly, unlike higher order
human goods, there will be no corresponding evil of the same order left out of this sort of
defense. After all, it is a basic tenet of classic theism that there simply are no divine evils to take
into account. God is wholly good, after all. So perhaps here we have a place to stop Mackie’s
vicious regress and explain those evils that could not be sufficiently explained by the higher order
human goods.
What we have here now are the makings of a potentially successful greater-goods
defense, whereby we can justify the existence of lower order evils via the higher order, moral
goods whose existence such evils make possible, with the ultimate moral goods being the divine
goods of displaying divine virtue. Indeed, as has been suggested throughout the Augustinian and
Calvinist traditions in Christianity, one might understand God’s primary goal in allowing evil,
which according to many in these traditions is to “glorify himself”, as primarily a matter of
producing precisely these divine goods required by this greater-goods defense. When a Calvinist
declares that God’s chief aim is to glorify himself and that this is why there is evil, so that God
would be even more glorified, we can, on this way of understanding it, take God’s selfglorification to be simply a matter of God’s self-display of divine virtue. The more perfect in
quality and quantity of such displays, and the more aspects of God’s character they reflect, the
more the character of God is reflected in the world, which is a more-than-plausible interpretation
of what it means for God to be glorified.
This greater-goods response, then, stands firmly in the Augustinian-Calvinist tradition
(though it could well be used by theists who do not do so, including those who happen to fall
outside the Christian tradition altogether). It is now important to add that according to both this
tradition as well as much of the larger Christian tradition as a whole, God most glorifies himself
through undertaking his plan of redemption, particularly through his Incarnation and Atonement,
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in order to bring salvation to the world. Many medievals, in fact, found the Incarnation to be the
very pinnacle and end-goal of creation itself. And Christians throughout all ages have found the
value of God’s redemption of humankind, here represented by the Atonement, to be second to
none. But redemption, of course, requires that there be someone to be redeemed and something
for them to be redeemed from. And this requires a Fall, or at least some kind of fallen state.
God’s great act of redemption logically requires that there be fallen people. And if, as a number
of thinkers have suggested, the acts of God’s redemption – specifically, as embodied in the
Incarnation and Atonement – are the highest of goods then in order for the highest of goods to be
realized in a world, such a world must be at some time or other a fallen one. That is, it must be a
world of sin, evil, and death. This thought – that the Fall was necessary or justified because of
the greater goodness of the redemption which required it – can be found throughout the history of
the church and the sorts of defenses or theodicies which are based on such a thought have been
known as Felix Culpa views after the “O felix culpa!/ O happy fault!” line in the famous hymn
from the Latin liturgy. This hymn, the “Exultet”, entered the liturgy somewhere between the fifth
and seventh centuries and embodies an early expression of a Felix Culpa response to the Fall, one
which finds many echoes before and after.3
Indeed, fitting nicely with the greater-goods defense we have been so far examining,
Felix Culpa views have often defended the great value of the Incarnation and Atonement
precisely in terms of their value as displays of the divine character. Along these lines, Melville
Stewart (1993, 153 – see also his 1986) says, “[R]edemption allows God to demonstrate his love
in a way that otherwise he could not”. In firm agreement, Paul Helm (1993, 215) proclaims,
“Finally, without the permission of moral evil, and the atonement of Christ, God’s own character
would not be fully manifest”. Arthur Lovejoy (1948, 294), of this approach to the Fall, claims,

3

Lovejoy (1948), in his essay on John Milton’s appropriation of this tradition in Paradise Lost, notes that
these ideas find expression or echoes early on in, for example, Ambrose, Augustine, Pope Leo I, and
Gregory the Great.
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“God himself needed a fallen race to evoke fully the divine attributes and powers.” Alvin
Plantinga (2004, 7), in his defense of a Felix Culpa theodicy, asks, “Could there be a display of
love to rival this? More to the present purposes, could there be a good-making feature of a world
to rival this?”. Later in the same work (op cit., 20), Plantinga adds that God may be so loving that
he “would be willing to undergo the suffering involved in incarnation and atonement, even to
save just one sinner…but that is compatible with its being more appropriate that God’s
magnificent action here save many, perhaps indefinitely many.” Finally, Jesse Couenhaven finds
such views in as early a figure as Augustine, of whom Couenhaven (2007, 294) claims,
“Augustine’s late theodicy is thus, basically, an argument that a world in which at least some
relate to God as redeemer is beautiful and good in ways that an alternative world in which none
relate to God as redeemer, and there is no evil, is not.”
On this view, then, there would be tremendous goods missing were there no Fall and no
evil.

Higher order human goods would be missing, as would many divine goods.

And

preeminent among the missing, highly valuable divine goods, would be God’s ultimate displays
of love and self-sacrifice in his Incarnation and then Atonement.

But notice that such an

approach does not require us to accept an incompatibilist view of freedom. So long as the moral
and divine goods are all intact, we have a sufficient justification for the existence of evil without
relying on Libertarian free will. Recommending a Felix Culpa view to fellow determinists, Nick
Trakakis (2006, 31) writes,
On this view, the fall is either the only way or the most fitting way for us to be
provided with the kind of disclosure of divine love made available in Christ’s
life, death and resurrection. In line with this view, the divine determinist may
add, in response to Mackie’s challenge [from evil], that a ‘fallen’ world enables
God to reveal himself, and in particular his grace and mercy, more fully than in a
world in which no-one needs renewal or salvation.
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I would recommend, then, for all theists, this greater goods/glorifying God response to the
problem of evil as an alternative to the free will response. And I would recommend it specifically
to Christian theists, particularly as it is refined in the particularly Christian way proper to the
Felix Culpa tradition.
To flesh out this view a bit more, we ought to see how it might incorporate perhaps the
greatest apparent evil of all – that of eternal damnation. It may be natural for some to wonder
here whether, due to the fact that the pinnacle of divine goods is found in God’s redemptive
activity, this means that universalism must be true – that is, that all persons will eventually be
redeemed from sin and evil. After all, if evil only exists so that various virtues may be displayed
and if the highest good for the sake of which we are fallen is so that God might redeem us, thus
displaying his infinite love and self-sacrifice, why would anyone be left out of such a redemption
– especially given that being left out is such a horrendous thing?
If we accept a Libertarian view of free will, I think it is much easier to reject universalism
at this point. But suppose we do not. Suppose we are compatibilists. Must a compatibilist who
takes on our proposed response to the problem of evil also accept universalism? The short
answer is no. Defending this answer, however, may be a little more complicated. I will here only
make some gestures towards such a defense. Suppose first that the traditional view of eternal
damnation is true and that the damned exist forever in a state of brokenness and separation from
God’s redeemed order. In that case, the existence of this great evil – persons suffering eternal
conscious damnation – may be justified by another divine good, that of displaying God’s just
wrath against sin (and those who commit it) and having this in eternal juxtaposition with his
eternal display of just love and salvation towards the redeemed. To paraphrase Augustine, God is
just in condemning people and loving and gracious in saving them. To save is an act of pure
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grace and, perhaps, thus not morally required of God – or at least not universally so. And the
divine good of displaying wrathful justice in damnation is also an important divine good
alongside the divine good of displaying love in redemption.

As Couenhoven (2007, 293)

describes Augustine’s views, the suggestion is “that the best explanation of the scriptural witness
concerning God’s character and behaviour is that the Fall and limited forms of punishment by
themselves is not enough to show the full depth of God’s justice and mercy; both the Fall and
eternal punishment are required.” On the other hand, if annihilationism is true and the damned
are ultimately sentenced to non-existence rather than an eternal existence of low or negative
value, then we have much less evil to deal with and the charge that damnation creates too much
negative value in a world to possibly be justified seems to begin to loosen its grip. Either way,
we have some kind of answer to give if we decide not to be universalists and still accept the
divine goods response.
I believe that this view of the role of damnation in the divine goods response also has the
resources to tackle a couple of potential objections that one might hear from time to time against
views such as this. One is that Christ’s suffering and death on the Cross was a sufficient and
ultimate display of God’s justice and wrath and that hence further display is not needed. I am not
sure, however, that this is not question-begging or at least not unclear. Surely the event of the
Cross is a “sufficient and ultimate display” in the sense that nothing need be added to it to legally
atone for anyone’s sins who might, by God’s grace, place themselves in the body of Christ.
Christ’s suffering was enough to take the place of all and anyone to earn them redemption, should
they receive such a gift. But here we are not concerned with legal or redemptive sufficiency or
ultimacy. What we are concerned with is whether, to maximize the divine goods in the best, most
justified way, this will require that some persons be ultimately eternally damned. In such a case,
it is by no means clear that any world with the Atonement and no damnation will display God’s
wrath and judgment just as well as one with it. Indeed, it seems to me that the opposite is more
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probably the case, the eternal juxtaposition of love and wrath displaying the two qualities in all
their glory being much better than the display of only one of them.4
In response to Supralapsarian views which hold that God decided to glorify himself by
creating creatures to be variously damned and redeemed, Diller (2008, 95) asks, seemingly
rhetorically, whether a world could really have more value if it featured people who had eternally
broken relationships with God than if it did not. Indeed, he (op cit., 92-93) also claims that it is
plausible to see the Atonement as a mere means to the end of a right relationship with God and
that this is its source of great value, a concern echoed by Bruce Reichenbach (1988, 81). Contra
some Felix Culpa supporters, Diller rightly sees that (absent considerations from Libertarian
freedom, perhaps) God could very well have established a right relationship with his creatures
and even went through Incarnation without any Fall or any sin and evil.
So if Diller is right about this then the great goods of the Atonement and Incarnation do
not require sin and evil since the Incarnation can occur without them and redemption without
Atonement is all that is required to bring about the value possessed by the Atonement. After all,
the Atonement has value precisely as that which brings a right relationship with God, and apart
from this quality we can probably all agree that it would have little or no positive value.
However, I think both Diller and Reichenbach are too quick here to think that this fact shows that
the Atonement’s value is merely instrumental value insofar as it brings salvation. It is important
to remember that relational value and instrumental value do in fact come apart. Indeed, we can
perfectly agree that the Atonement’s value is largely grounded precisely in its bringing salvation.
But that does not mean that this value is purely instrumental. It is important to look at the big
picture – without sin or evil, important divine goods would be missing and it is precisely because
a relationship with God is so immensely valuable that the Atonement as God’s rescue of us into it
4

Note that these kinds of considerations might also be used to effectively answer Reichenbach 80-81,
where he questions whether it would really be more valuable to have a Fall and then redemption rather than
have everyone simply begin in perfection.
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is also so valuable a display of his sacrificial love. Without sin, there would definitely be
displays of divine love, but it would not be like this and it would not be so valuable. And without
eternal displays of divine wrath, it may not be so clear that things would really be more valuable.
If the divine goods view we have been canvassing so far is correct and its assessment of the role
of damnation in achieving the divine goods is also correct, then Diller’s question ultimately has a
relatively straightforward answer – the answer is a resounding yes, as paradoxical as that might
initially sound. A world really could have more value if it featured people who had eternally
broken relationships with God than if it did not. The Felix Culpa and divine good views seem to
emerge, if not unscathed, then definitely still alive and kicking from Diller’s attacks. So I think,
ultimately, the defender of the doctrine of eternal damnation, whether in its traditional or more
revised forms, can incorporate their views into the divine goods view without too much difficulty
and hence reap from it a kind of defense or theodicy of Hell unattached to and unadorned with
any presuppositions about the nature of free will.
So far, I think we can see that this divine goods view that I have been examining is
powerful indeed. There are, however, some much more serious objections to it that have yet to be
considered. I will answer the main one first, followed by two lesser objections. The first of these
is that the persons whom God creates in a sinful, evil world are in fact being used merely as a
means for God to achieve his greater divine goods – a seemingly bad and unloving action on the
part of God. This Kantian point, of course, holds no weight if some sort of consequentialism
were correct, or at least if it happened to be so for God. But suppose consequentialism is not
correct and that it is in fact a fairly absolute matter that we should never treat a person as a mere
means to our ends, no matter how good these ends may be. In that case, I still think we can get
around this criticism. Consider, for example, ordinary punishment of criminals. This, at first
glance, looks to be an example of treating people as means only – few, if any, really want to be
punished after all. But if we are rejecting consequentialism of any sort, then it becomes unclear
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what could justify such apparent violations of the criminals’ autonomy. Here I think the most
likely approach is to take a rather Kantian line in response to this rather Kantian problem. The
idea is to take punishment to be precisely the way we ought to treat criminals if we are to treat
them as ends in themselves. By doing evil, they in effect condone whatever punishment they
deserve and make it a matter of justice and respect for them as rational beings to see to it that they
are punished appropriately. A full Kantian retributive account of punishment will, of course, be
more complicated, but this superficial gloss ought to be enough at this point to do the work for
which it is needed.
Now let us put this Kantian view of punishment into play. We can now claim that, as far
as our own voluntary sin goes, since it is precisely voluntary God is not using us as a mere means
when he sets things up in the beginning so that we will end up committing some particular sin.
After all, we have consented to it. And all the other evil we suffer can – perhaps at least in part –
be seen as punitive in nature. Since it is suffered as a punishment for our own voluntary evil,
such evil or suffering will not count as a violation of our autonomy on God’s part.
One might wonder, however, how this deals with, for instance, the suffering of innocent
children – are they not being used as mere means? But if Helm (1993, 211) and many other
Reformed thinkers are right, then the Fall may make guilt for sin universal, even among children.
If the doctrines of original sin and original guilt are taken on board – assuming the combination
of the two can be adequately defended – then we have our answer. Indeed, more generally, as
Plantinga (2004, 24) states, we could also potentially argue that much of the suffering that we –
children or not – undergo might also be justifiably thought to respect our autonomy if I actually
consent to it, if I would consent to it were I able to make the decision or be free of relevant
ignorance, or perhaps even if I would consent to it were my disordered affections suitably
repaired.
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The second objection I wish to consider is that God is not just to judge us or punish us for
our sins since it is God who ordains that we sin in the first place. Of course, much of the sting of
this objection is already removed by my answer to the previous one – by voluntarily doing wrong,
we thereby call judgment and punishment upon ourselves. And it is, after all, part of God’s
cosmic role to be the one who ensures that such punishment is paid out. Indeed, if determinism is
true, then no punishment could be paid out without God’s consent. So if someone deserves
punishment and can only be punished if God determines it – if it would be unjust not to do so,
since there is no one else to take over this task – then I can see little plausibility in the claim that
God is not in fact obliged by justice to mete it out.
Now for the final objection. The final one, which may be found in Diller (2008, 96), and
which one hears sometimes in theological circles in regards to theodicies in general, is that if a
Felix Culpa or related response describes reality truly then “[w]e can no longer condemn evil and
injustice as wholly antithetical to what is good.” One might also find this sentiment expressed
various other ways: “It would make evil good”, “It would trivialize peoples’ pain and suffering”,
“It would rid us of our reasons for preventing evil”, and so on. But these sort of objections
represent a significant misunderstanding of the view under consideration. As Stewart (1993, 146)
insists, the Fall and evil are all inherently bad. They just so happen to also be instrumentally
good. One mistake behind the kind of objection we are now considering is to fail to see this
difference. That something is instrumentally good and that God is justified in allowing it for
something greater does not render that thing any less bad in its own right. Indeed, such a cost
ought to be seen as indeed costly and genuinely lamentable in its necessity. It ought not to make
any of us any less vigilant against evil since we are not in God’s position and morality (as well as
God himself) still demands that we prevent evil. Indeed, our prevention of evil is precisely one of
the higher order goods for which evil exists in the first place!
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Given our discussion, what then should we say about the problem of evil? Ultimately, I find the
free will response highly attractive. I am myself a Libertarian about free will and would gladly
appeal to this view in defense of theism. However, I also find the view defended so far in this
paper one worthy of even further defense and development. Moral goods, both human and
divine, are natural components of a response to the problem of evil, particularly such great divine
goods as those embodied in God’s redemptive work on behalf of humankind. Such a response
not only seems to do well against general evil and suffering but also against the potentially
infinite sufferings of hell and eternal damnation. I most definitely have not fully deflected all
possible moral criticism of such a response, nor have I even necessarily provided unanswerable
replies to the objections I have addressed. What I hope I have done is to show that such a view is
not completely out of the ball park in regards to plausibility and, indeed, that it is worth our
consideration. If Libertarianism is true, as I think it is, perhaps the best idea would be to try to
have the best of both worlds – to combine the free will response with the divine goods response
canvassed here. Libertarian freedom could indeed do wonders in deflecting any remaining moral
criticism from the divine goods view and the divine goods view could do the same for the free
will response. If we then integrated some sort of soul-making view into this mix, that would truly
be a response to the problem of evil that would be hard to beat. Not only would the various
combined views be mutually reinforcing, but we would also be able to potentially successfully
combine and weave together (at least on this particular topic) multiple theological traditions into
one coherent whole – Felix Culpa traditions, divine glorification traditions, Augustinian and
Calvinist traditions, free will traditions, Irenaean traditions, and so on. In doing so, we would be
heeding the wisdom of the Teacher:
Though one may be overpowered,
two can defend themselves.
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A cord of three strands is not quickly broken.5
If nothing else excites the theist trying to find an adequate solution to the problem of evil, the
prospects of such a combined, strengthened front should.
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